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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Mark Travis Garnett appeals from the judgment of conviction entered upon the
trial verdict finding him guilty of unlawful possession of a firearm. On appeal, Garnett
challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
In 2016, Tamara Brunko was on felony probation. (R., pp.98-99.) Pursuant to the
terms of her probation agreement, Brunko “waive[d]…her Fourth Amendment Rights
concerning searches,” and was required to consent to searches of her residence. (3/21/17
Tr., p.25, L.1 – p.26, L.1; Exhibits, p.13.1) During this time, Brunko lived in a singlewide trailer with her boyfriend, Andrew Soy, and her son. (R., pp.98-99; 3/21/17 Tr.,
p.8, Ls.1-5.)
In November 2016, Brunko became non-compliant with the terms and
conditions of her probation.

(R., p.99.)

She failed to complete required inpatient

substance abuse treatment and submitted a diluted urine sample. (Id.; 3/21/17 Tr., p.27,
L.2 – p.28, L.23.) Additionally, Brunko’s son had missed several days of school. (R.,
p.99.) Officer Jason Haines, Brunko’s supervising probation officer, went with several
other officers to Brunko’s residence to attempt to make contact with her. (R., pp.98-99;
3/21/17 Tr., p.22, Ls.13 – p.23, L.5.)
Upon arrival, officers made contact with Soy, who confirmed that Brunko still
lived at the residence. (R., p.99.) Soy took several steps back from the door and the
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Exhibits in the appellate record are contained within the electronic file, “CR 16-21824
GARNETT #45282 EXHIBITS.pdf.” Citations to page numbers of the “Exhibits” refer
to the page numbers of this file. (Exhibits, pp.7-14; 3/21/17 Tr., p.26, Ls.9-15.)
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officers entered the residence. (R., pp.99-100.) The officers observed Garnett, who had
stayed at the residence as a guest the previous evening, lying on a sofa. (R., p.99; 3/21/17
Tr., p.13, L.23 – p.14, L.6.) Brunko was not present. (R., p.100.)
The officers proceeded to search the residence for contraband. (Id.) Officer
Haines searched a storage room that had been built on to the back door of the trailer.
(Id.)

The room contained a “hodge-podge” of items including clothes, household

supplies, pulled-out drawers containing paperwork, and a purse. (3/21/17 Tr., p.38, L.9 –
p.39, L.5.) In this storage room, Officer Haines located a backpack with a lock on it
behind a large moving box. (R., p.100; 3/21/17 Tr., p.39, Ls.6-18.) The backpack had no
identifying marks or other exterior indicators of ownership. (R., p.100.) Officer Haines
removed the lock and searched the backpack. (R., p.101; 3/21/17 Tr., p.41, L.14 – p.42,
L.5.) The backpack contained a handgun, ammo, gun cleaning supplies, and a piece of
mail addressed to Garnett.

(R., p.101.)

Officers subsequently determined that the

handgun had been stolen. (Id.) The state charged Garnett with unlawful possession of a
firearm and grand theft. (R., pp.32-33.)
Garnett filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained from the backpack on the
ground that the residence and backpack were unlawfully searched. (R., pp.37-45.) After
a hearing (3/21/17 Tr.), the district court denied the motion (R., pp.98-116). The court
concluded that while Garnett, as an overnight guest, had a legitimate expectation of
privacy in the backpack and thus standing to challenge the warrantless search, Officer
Haines’ search did not violate the Fourth Amendment. (Id.) Specifically, the court
concluded that because Officer Haines possessed reasonable suspicion that Brunko
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owned, possessed, or controlled the backpack, the search was within the lawful scope of
the search consented to by Brunko through her Fourth Amendment waiver. (Id.)
After a trial, the jury found Garnett guilty of unlawful possession of a firearm.
(R., p.215; Trial Tr., p.349, Ls.5-17.) The district court declared a mistrial on the grand
theft charge after the jury was unable to reach a verdict. (Trial Tr., p.346, L.22 – p.348,
L.8.) At the sentencing hearing, the state agreed to dismiss the grand theft charge in
exchange for Garnett recommending a sentence of at least three years fixed on the
unlawful possession of a firearm charge. (6/22/17 Tr., p.59, Ls.9-16.) The district court
imposed a fixed five-year sentence on that charge. (R., pp.265-266; 6/22/17 Tr., p.83,
L.16 – p.86, L.15.) Garnett timely appealed. (R., pp.267-270.)

3

ISSUE
Has Garnett failed to show that the district court erred by denying his motion to
suppress evidence obtained from Officer Haines’ search of the backpack?

4

ARGUMENT
Garnett Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred By Denying His Motion To
Suppress Evidence Obtained From Officer Haines’ Search Of The Backpack
A.

Introduction
Garnett contends that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress

evidence obtained from Officer Haines’ search of his backpack. (Appellant’s brief, pp.818.)

Specifically, Garnett contends that the officers’ authority to search Brunko’s

residence pursuant to the terms of her probation agreement did not extend to the
backpack recovered from a storage room in the trailer, and that State v. Barker, 136 Idaho
728, 40 P.3d 86 (2001), the authority relied upon by the district court, is inconsistent with
applicable United States Supreme Court precedent. (Id.) This Court should decline to
consider this issue because Garnett has failed to preserve it for appeal. In any event,
Garnett’s contention fails because a review of the totality of the circumstances reveals
that Officer Haines had reasonable suspicion that Brunko owned, possessed, or controlled
the backpack. Therefore, the search was lawful pursuant to Barker, and Garnett has
failed to demonstrate that the district court erred.

B.

Standard Of Review
In reviewing an order granting or denying a motion to suppress evidence, the

appellate court applies a bifurcated standard of review. State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206,
207, 207 P.3d 182, 183 (2009) (citing State v. Watts, 142 Idaho 230, 232, 127 P.3d 133,
135 (2005)). The appellate court defers to the trial court's factual findings unless they are
clearly erroneous; however, the appellate court freely reviews the determination as to
whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the facts found. State
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v. Hansen, 151 Idaho 342, 345, 256 P.3d 750, 753 (2011) (citing State v. Smith, 144
Idaho 482, 485, 163 P.3d 1194, 1197 (2007)).

C.

Garnett Failed To Preserve The Ground For Suppression He Raises On Appeal
It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely objection must

be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for appeal. State v. Vondenkamp,
141 Idaho 878, 885, 119 P.3d 653, 660 (Ct. App. 2005) (citing State v. Carlson, 134
Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000)). Further, when a defendant pursues a
suppression motion, only the specific grounds raised in the district court are preserved for
appeal. See e.g., State v. Anderson, 154 Idaho 703, 705-706, 302 P.3d 328, 330-331
(2012) (holding that the defendant preserved only two of the three grounds for
suppression that he attempted to raise on appeal).
In this case, Garnett argues that Barker was wrongly decided and that the district
court erred by applying the standard set forth in that case to analyze whether the lawful
scope of the officers’ consent search of Brunko’s residence included the backpack
recovered from the storage room. (Appellant’s brief, pp.8-19.) Garnett did not raise this
argument below.

Instead, Garnett argued only that: (1) Garnett had a reasonable

expectation of privacy in the backpack; and (2) Brunko’s probation agreement did not
constitute valid consent to search the residence in the first place. (R., pp.40-45, 82-89.)
Despite the state’s reliance on Barker and related cases in its briefs filed in the district
court (R., pp.54-57, 95-97), Garnett did not argue that Barker was wrongly decided or
inapplicable in this case, or that some other standard informed a proper analysis of the
scope of a consent search. (See id.) The district court therefore did not have the
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opportunity to rule on the argument Garnett now raises on appeal. This argument is
therefore waived, and should not be considered by this Court.

D.

In The Alternative, The District Court Correctly Determined That Brunko’s
Consent Justified Officer Haines’ Search Of Garnett’s Backpack
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable

searches. 2 Warrantless searches are unconstitutional, unless they are authorized by a
recognized exception to the warrant requirement. Barker, 136 Idaho at 730, 40 P.3d at 88
(citing State v. Johnson, 110 Idaho 516, 716 P.2d 1288 (1986)).
Properly given consent is a recognized exception to the warrant requirement. Id.
“When the state seeks to justify a warrantless search based upon consent, it is not limited
to proof that the consent was given by the defendant.” Id. The state may show that
consent came from a third party who “possessed common authority over or other
sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected.” Id. at 730-31,
40 P.3d at 88-89 (citing United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974)). “The common
authority of the third party does not rest upon the law of property.” Id. The state is not
required to show the third party actually had a property interest in the effects searched.
Id. “Rather, the common authority rests upon the joint access or control of the property
searched.” Id. The standard for measuring the scope of a consent to search is that of
objective reasonableness. Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (1991).
In Barker, the Idaho Supreme Court analyzed the lawful scope of a warrantless
search justified by a parolee’s waiver of his Fourth Amendment rights. Barker, 136

2

Garnett did not argue, to the district court or on appeal, that the Idaho Constitution
provides more protection than the Fourth Amendment with respect to the relevant issues
in this case. (See R., pp.40-45; Appellant’s brief, pp.8-18.)
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Idaho at 730-732, 40 P.3d at 88-90. Tate, Barker’s boyfriend, violated his parole by
failing to report to his parole officer. Id. at 729, 40 P.3d at 87. The parole officer went to
Barker’s apartment after learning that Tate had been seen there. Id. at 729-730, 40 P.3d
at 87-88. The officer located Tate outside of the apartment and arrested him. Id. at 730,
40 P.3d at 88. Tate told the officer that he had been living at Barker’s apartment for the
previous few weeks. Id.
Officers then contacted Barker at the apartment. Id. Despite Barker’s denials that
Tate had been living there, the officers searched the apartment pursuant to Tate’s Fourth
Amendment waiver. Id. The officers also located a fanny pack on a counter in the
master bedroom. Id. A drug dog alerted on the fanny pack. Id. After Barker then
admitted ownership of the fanny pack, officers searched it and located methamphetamine
and a vehicle title with both Tate’s and Barker’s names on it. Id. The state charged
Barker with possession of methamphetamine. Id.
The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s denial of Barker’s motion
to suppress evidence recovered from the fanny pack. Id. at 730-732, 40 P.3d at 88-90.
The Court first held that Tate’s parole agreement constituted valid consent to search
Tate’s and Barker’s residence, including the master bedroom which was occupied by
both Tate and Barker. Id. at 731, 40 P.3d at 89.
The Court then held that the scope of this search extended to the fanny pack. Id.
at 731-732, 40 P.3d at 89-90. The Court concluded that the officers could lawfully search
any item in the shared bedroom if they possessed reasonable suspicion that Tate owned,
possessed, or controlled the item. Id. (citing United States v. Davis, 932 F.2d 752 (9th
Cir. 1991).) The Court further recognized that the “circumstances need not indicate that
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the item was obviously and undeniably owned, possessed, or controlled by Tate,” and
that the officers were not required to inquire into the ownership, possession, or control of
the fanny pack. Id. at 732, 40 P.3d at 90. Finally, after reviewing the totality of the
circumstances of the case (including that: (1) a drug dog alerted on the fanny pack; (2)
Tate was on parole for possession of a controlled substance; (3) before absconding from
supervision, Tate submitted a urine sample to his parole officer that tested positive for a
controlled substance; (4) the fanny pack was located in the bedroom that was occupied
jointly by Tate and Barker; and (5) there was nothing about the fanny pack’s location or
appearance that indicated it was owned, possessed, and controlled exclusively by Barker),
the Idaho Supreme Court concluded that the officer had reasonable suspicion that Tate
had at least joint possession or control of the fanny pack, and that the search was
therefore lawful under the Fourth Amendment. Id.
In the present case, Garnett does not dispute any of the factual findings of the
district court (see generally Appellant’s brief), and concedes that the officers had the
authority, pursuant to Brunko’s Fourth Amendment waiver, to search the residence
(Appellant’s brief, p.9). Instead, Garnett contends that Officer Haines’ search of the
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backpack exceeded the lawful scope of this search. 3 (Appellant’s brief, pp.8-18.) A
review of the record reveals that the district court properly applied Barker and concluded
that Officer Haines possessed reasonable suspicion that Garnett had at least joint
possession or control of the backpack.
First, and perhaps most significantly, Officer Haines located the backpack not
near Garnett or the sofa that Garnett was lying on, but in a storage room behind a large
moving box. (R., p.100; 3/21/17 Tr., p.39, Ls.9-18.) This storage room contained
numerous household items including clothes, paperwork, and sink faucets. (3/21/17 Tr.,
p.38, L.9 – p.39, L.5.) Thus, it was apparent that the room was not utilized exclusively
for guest belongings, but was likely accessed and controlled by the permanent residents
of the household. Officer Garnett thus possessed reasonable suspicion that Brunko, as
one of the two known permanent residents of the trailer, had at least joint possession or
control of the backpack found in storage room containing domestic household items.
This is particularly true in light of the backpack’s positioning behind a large moving box
– not an area where one would expect to find the luggage of an overnight guest.

3

On appeal, Garnett also construes the district court’s order denying his motion to
suppress as concluding that the search of the backpack was additionally justified by
Officer Haines’ reasonable suspicion that Brunko was in violation of her probation.
(Appellant’s brief, pp.8, 15-18.) However, the district court arrived at this conclusion
only in response to Garnett’s argument that the officers were required, pursuant to State
v. Turek, 150 Idaho 745, 250 P.3d 796 (Ct. App. 2001), to obtain Brunko’s consent to
enter and search her apartment (R., pp.114-115). The district court rejected Garnett’s
argument on the grounds that: (1) probation searches may be conducted without consent
when the officers are investigating their reasonable suspicion of violation of probation
terms; and (2) the officers possessed such reasonable suspicion in this case. (R., pp.114115 (citing Turek, 150 Idaho 745, 250 P.3d 796; State v. Pinson, 104 Idaho 227, 657 P.2d
1095 (Ct. App. 1983).) Because Garnett does not dispute this conclusion on appeal, and
because he concedes that the officers had lawful authority to search Brunko’s residence
(Appellant’s brief, p.9), the state does not otherwise address the district court’s analysis
with respect to this point in its Respondent’s brief.
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Further, despite Officer Haines’ specific attempts to locate such, there was no
physical indications, such as a name tag or other identifying characteristic on the exterior
of the backpack indicating that the backpack was owned, possessed, or exclusively
controlled by some individual other than Brunko. (R., p.100; 3/21/17 Tr., p.39, L.21 –
p.40, L.4.)

Also, Officer Haines testified at the suppression hearing that, from his

experience, it is not uncommon for individuals such as Brunko who are on probation or
parole to place items in locked containers in an attempt to dissuade probation searches.
(3/21/17 Tr., p.37, Ls.5-15; p.41, Ls.2-13.) Therefore, it was reasonable for Officer
Haines to suspect that the backpack was simply one of many other household items in the
storage room controlled, at least in part, by Brunko.
Additionally, Garnett did not object to the search of the residence, or of the
backpack specifically. (R., p.100; 3/21/17 Tr., p.17, L.17 – p.19, L.14.) Nor did Garnett
inform the officers that there were specific items that exclusively belonged to him in the
residence. (3/21/17 Tr., p.52, Ls.17-20.) While not determinative, an active objection is
important to the reasonableness of the officer’s belief in the apparent authority that
justifies a search. See State v. Benson, 133 Idaho 152, 159, 983 P.2d 225, 232 (Ct. App.
1999); State v. Frizzel, 132 Idaho 522, 975 P.2d 1187 (Ct. App. 1999). An officer may
not be able to rely upon a third party’s apparent authority to a search when another party
with a superior possessory interest in the property is present and objects or denies
consent. Benson, 133 Idaho at 159, 983 P.2d at 232. “When an individual who has a
possessory interest in an item remains silent while a third party with apparent authority
gives consent to search an item, it is objectively reasonable for a police officer to
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conclude that he ‘had all the consent that was constitutionally required.’” Id. (citing
Frizzel, 132 Idaho at 525, 975 P.2d at 1190.)
On appeal, Garnett contends that the district court applied an erroneous standard
in determining whether the backpack was within the lawful scope of Officer Haines’
search of the residence. (Appellant’s brief, pp.10-13.) Specifically, Garnett argues that
the standard set forth in Barker, which permits officers performing a lawful consent
search of an area to search the contents of any container in that area if they possess
reasonable suspicion that the individual whose consent the search is based upon owned,
possessed, or controlled the item, is contrary to United States Supreme Court precedent
as set forth in Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990). (Id.) However, a review of the
applicable caselaw reveals that Garnett’s contention fails, and the district court properly
relied upon Barker in denying Garnett’s motion to suppress. Further, Idaho jurisprudence
requires respect for its precedents. The rule of stare decisis dictates that controlling
precedent be followed “unless it is manifestly wrong, unless it has proven over time to be
unjust or unwise, or unless overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious
principles of law and remedy continued injustice.” State v. Dana, 137 Idaho 6, 9, 43 P.3d
765, 768 (2002). Garnett has failed to show either that Rodriguez is applicable to this
case, or that Barker should be overruled.
In Rodriguez, officers gained warrantless entry to a suspect’s apartment after
obtaining consent from a third party who described the residence as “our” apartment, and
who told police that she had clothes and furniture there. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 179.
Officers arrested Rodriguez at the apartment and recovered drugs and drug paraphernalia
in plain view. Id. at 180. The United States Supreme Court held that a warrantless entry
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into a residence is valid when based upon the consent of a third party whom the police, at
the time of entry, “reasonably believed” to possess common authority over the premises,
regardless of whether the third party actually possessed such authority. Id. at 179-189.
In other words, the Court held that an officer’s consent-based initial entry into a
residence must be based upon a “reasonable belief” that the individual granting the
consent actually had sufficient authority over the residence to provide such consent. Id.
This “reasonable belief” standard has no application to the present case, in which
the issue is not whether the officers had the authority to enter and search the residence in
the first place, but whether Officer Haines’ search of the backpack was within the lawful
scope of the search for which the officers already possessed consent to effectuate. The
officers’ initial entry and search of Garnett’s apartment, as conceded by Garnett on
appeal (Appellant’s brief, p.3 n.5, p.9), was justified by both Soy permitting the officers
to enter, and by Brunko’s probation status and Fourth Amendment waiver. Once the
officers were lawfully inside the residence, and once they had lawful authority to search
the residence, they were not required to develop a new, subjective, “reasonable belief”
with respect to Brunko’s possession or control of every individual container they came
across. Instead, as held in Barker and Davis, the officers could search any container at
the residence for which a totality of the circumstances demonstrated an objective
reasonable suspicion that the container was owned, possessed, or controlled, at least in
part, by Brunko. Barker, 136 Idaho at 730-732, 40 P.3d at 88-90; Davis, 932 F.2d at 757760; see also United States v. Bolivar, 670 F.3d 1091, 1093-1096 (9th Cir. 2012)
(rejecting Bolivar’s challenge to the Davis “reasonable suspicion” standard and
reaffirming that “[o]nce police officers properly enter a residence pursuant to
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a probation search, they need only a ‘reasonable suspicion’ to conclude that the
probationer owns, controls, or possesses a particular item within the probationer's
residence in order to search that item.” (emphasis added). 4

Contrary to Garnett’s

assertion on appeal, this standard, as applied to determine the lawful scope of a
warrantless consent search of a probationer’s residence, is not contrary to Rodriguez or
any other United States Supreme Court precedent.
Officer Haines possessed reasonable suspicion that the backpack located in the
storage room was owned, possessed, or controlled, at least in part, by Brunko. Therefore,
Officer Haines was permitted to search the backpack, and Garnett has failed to
demonstrate that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment of conviction
and the district court’s denial of Garnett’s motion to suppress.
DATED this 29th day of May, 2018.
_______/s/ Mark W. Olson____________________
Deputy Attorney General
MARK W. OLSON

4

In the alternative, the state submits that, for all the reasons set forth by the district court
and in this brief, Officer Haines’ search of the backpack was justified even pursuant to
the standard set forth by Garnett.
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 29th day of May, 2018, served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by emailing an electronic copy
to:
JASON C. PINTLER
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
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______/s/ Mark W. Olson_____
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